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ABSTRACT
TURKISH CONSERVATISM FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Gül Kolat
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Metin Heper
September 2002
This thesis serves for the aim of understanding the Turkish conservatism by
making comparative analysis and by focusing on the emergence of conservative
attitudes. This study aimed to examine the role of conservatism in the modernization
process of Turkish Republic. Modernization, or Westernization, has been one of the
most discussed issues of Turkish politics. Since conservatism was associated with
reaction against the modernization movements, it is important to look upon how
radical changes were perceived by conservatives and what kind of responses were
given to them in terms of understanding the modernization attempt of Turkey.
Conservatism emerged in Europe as a reaction to the ideas and movements
that became apparent with French Revolution. Since conservatism firstly emerged in
Europe, it provided an example for the other conservative experiences. The
significant examples of European conservatism are German, French, and British
conservatisms. In order to explore the affinity between the Turkish and European
conservatisms in terms of their initial phases, a kind of comparative analysis is
necessary. Firstly, I explore the basic characteristics of conservatism and focused on
the European conservatism by briefly giving the peculiar characteristics of three
examples. Then in order to understand the Turkish conservatism I focused on
responses of Turkish conservatism on modernization, change, nationalism and
Islamism. Under the light of these, I compare Turkish conservatism with European
conservatism.
Under the framework of above procedure, this thesis indicates that,
although there are similarities between European conservatism and Turkish
conservatism on basic characteristics of conservatism, conservative experiences have
been shaped according to peculiar historical, political, social and economic
characteristics of each context.
Keywords: Conservatism, Modernity, Kemalism, Nationalism, Islamism
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ÖZET
KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR BAKIŞ AÇISIDAN TÜRK MUHAFAZAKARLIĞI
Gül Kolat
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Metin Heper
Eylül 2002
Bu tez, muhafazakar tavırların ortaya çıkışına odaklanarak ve karşılaştırmalı analizle
Türk muhafazakarlığını anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye
Cumhuriyet’inin modernleşme sürecinde muhafazakarlığın rolünü incelemektir.
Modernleşme, yada Batılılaşma, Türk politikasının en çok tartışılan konularından birisidir.
Muhafazakarlık, modernleşme hareketlerine olan tepki ile özdeşleştiği için, radikal
değişimlerin muhafazakarlarca nasıl değerlendirildiği ve ne gibi cevaplar verildiği, Türk
modernleşmesini anlamak açısından önemlidir.
Muhafazakarlık, Avrupa’da Fransız Devrimi ile belirgin hale gelen düşünce ve
hareketlere reaksiyon olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Avrupa muhafazakarlığı bir ilk olarak diğer
muhafazakar deneyimlere örnek teşkil etmiştir. Avrupa muhafazakarlığının belirgin örnekleri,
Alman, Fransız ve İngiliz muhafazakarlıklarıdır. Türk ve Avrupa muhafazakarlıklarının çıkış
noktalarındaki yakınlıkları ortaya çıkarmak için karşılaştırmalı bir bakış gereklidir. Bu tezde,
ilk olarak, muhafazakarlığın temel özelliklerinin araştırılmasından ve Avrupa
muhafazakarlığının ve üç örnek ülkenin kendilerine has özellikleri ortaya konmasının
ardından,Türk muhafazakarlığının modernleşme, değişim, milliyetçilik ve İslamcılık olan
ilişkisi verilmiştir. Bu bölümlerin ışığı altında, Türk ve Avrupa muhafazakarlıkları
karşılaştırılmıştır.
Yukarıda anlatılan prosedür çerçevesinde, bu çalışma, Türk ve Avrupa
muhafazakarlıklarının arasında temel özellikler açısından benzerlikler olduğunu ortaya
koymuştur. Ancak muhafazakar deneyimlerin daha çok o ülkelerin tarihsel, politik, sosyal ve
ekonomik özellikleri tarafından şekillendiği gözlemlenmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Muhafazakarlık, Modernite, Kemalizm, Milliyetçilik, İslamcılık
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1CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Conservatism is a term that became apparent in politics after the French
Revolution as a reactionary and counter revolutionary movement and symbolized
its position as conserving some components of community and tradition which
were perceived as fundamental. Conservatism, as a response to modernity, later
changed its discourse and adapted itself to changing settings and modernization.
Conservatism developed as a counter revolutionary movement against the radical
changes experienced in various settings. Because of its reactive character,
conservatism became moderator in the radical changes. However, conservatism
was conceptualized as preservation of the status quo. Conservative movements in
various contexts and in various time periods were associated by those groups,
which lost their effectiveness and power in political, social and economic spheres
due to radical changes in these spheres. Thus conservatism could not be
understood as the tension between the ‘old’ and ‘new’. From another point of
view, conservatism could not be associated with one class such as aristocracy or
bourgeoisie.
2As a reactionary ideology, conservatism still dominates its position in the
political arena. On the other hand it should be noted that conservatism in the 19th
century could not be associated with the conservatism in the 20th century.
Especially after 1980’s, with the rise New Right, conservative themes became
dominant in the world politics. With increasing effects of right wing parties both
in European context and in Turkish context made me to think about the
conservatism in terms of its role in the politics.
Since conservatism was associated with reaction against the
modernization movements in general and French Revolution in particular, it is
useful to compare and contrast Turkish conservatism and European conservatism
in terms of their initial phases. How radical changes were perceived and what kind
of responses were given to them in these different contexts are important in terms
understanding the modernization attempt of Turkey. That is because
modernization movements correlated with the emergence of conservatism.
Modernization, or Westernization, has been one of the most discussed
issues of Turkish Republic. Modernization movements started in the 18th century
as a remedy for the backwardness of Ottoman Empire. In order to stop the decline
and dissolution of Ottoman Empire, first of all Ottomanism, which aimed to
embrace all the religious and ethnic communities living under the territory of
Ottoman Empire, was proposed in 1860s. Then Islamism, which was based on the
idea religious unity of ethnic communities, was tried between 1876 and 1908.
Lastly, nationalism, or Turkism, prepared the ground for the foundation of
republican regime, was proposed in the beginning of 20th century. With the
3intense reform period and modernization that followed, one could talk about the
existence of Turkish conservatism as a reaction to radical changes and break up
from the past.
In order to determine the validity of this thesis the focus of discussion
will concentrate on the emergence of conservative attitudes, in other words, on the
reactions to specific historical moment. As already noted conservatism existed in
Europe as counter reactionary movement against French Revolution and the ideas
that became dominant with it. For Turkish conservatism, it was the establishment
of Turkish Republic and reform movements that symbolized a radical break from
Ottoman Empire. It was initiated by bureaucratic intelligentsia.
In the first chapter, the scope of the study and the main question will be
proposed. Then the concept of conservatism will be discussed, that is its definition
and its defining characteristics.
In the second chapter, the focus will be on European conservatism. The
European conservatism will be taken as an ideal-type and its peculiar
characteristics will be discussed. The reason behind choosing European
conservatism as an ideal-type is the fact that “conservatism” firstly emerged in
Europe and provided an example for the other conservative experiences. The
European conservatism will be taken up with reference to German, French, and
British experiences. The aim in the analysis of these conservative experiences is
to prepare ground for the comparison between Turkish conservatism and
European conservatism.
4In the third chapter, the Turkish conservatism will be studied. Turkish
conservatism is usually associated with Islamism and/or nationalism. The question
of “Could Turkish conservatism be clearly differentiated from nationalist and
religious approaches?” will be addressed with specific reference to the works of
Tanıl Bora and Süleyman Seyfi Öğün. Then an attempt will be made to
conceptualize Turkish conservatism. Turkish conservatism will be discussed with
reference to the center–periphery tension in that polity and the role of
conservatives in that tension will be analyzed. After the conceptualization of
Turkish conservatism, the emergence of Turkish conservatism and its
manifestations before the change, that is, religion and nationalism will be looked
at.  In order to support the main points emphasized in this chapter, the discourse
analysis of the works of one of the conservative thinker will be made. Erol
Güngör was one of the conservative intellectuals, who gave importance to the
issues mostly discussed in this chapter. Through this analysis, one could
understand how conservatives perceived their position and the issues in the
modernization process of Turkey.
In the fourth chapter, by taking into consideration the discussions made
in the previous chapters, a comparison will be made between Turkish
conservatism and European conservatism. This comparison, which will be
grounded upon statement of similarities and differences, will hopefully contribute
to better understand the Turkish conservatism. Although a brief analysis of
German, British and French conservatism was presented, the comparison will be
made with European conservatism by not taking into consideration peculiar
5characteristics of each context in Europe. Conclusion will also include the general
evaluation of what was tried to be done in this essay and a general evaluation of
the conservative tendencies both in the European and Turkish contexts.
The Concept of Conservatism
Conservatism literally comes from the verb “to conserve”. All
discussions focused on the word: to conserve. The definitions and the defining
characteristics of conservatism were determined by this word and by questions
such as, What was to be conserved? Why “this” would be conserved? In order to
understand conservatism better one should discuss what conservatism was against.
However, conceptualizing conservatism as what it was against is not an easy task
because there was a lack of consensus over what the term “conservatism” actually
meant. It was usually associated with the preservation of the status quo.
According to Suvanto1 conservatism had two different meanings. As a
general outlook, conservatism could be defined as a desire to preserve what was
old and by an aversion to rapid changes. As a political view, conservatism
referred to a right–wing ideology regarded as stressing traditional values,
opposing revolutionary aspirations, and advocating moderation in reforms. In
Aughley’s2 words, ‘conservatism’ could be defined as reaction, which derived
from the dissolving character of modernism on political, social and cultural
structures. In other words this reaction arose from the continuity of meanings that
                                                          
1 Suvanto, Pekka. Conservatism from French Revolution to the 1990s. Ipswich: Macmillan Press,
1997, p.2
2 Aughey, Arthur., Jones, Greta., and Riches W.T.M. The Conservative Politics and Tradition in
Britain and United States. Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1992, p.113
6were attributed to political, social and cultural structures. Conservatism stressed
the limits of human reason, the solid wisdom of tradition, and, therefore, the limits
of political action to change the human condition, specifically opposed the
destruction of the institutional framework of society and the concentration of
political power in the pursuit of some absolute and transcendent principle.
Conservatism: an Ideology or an Outlook
Among the scholars there has not been a consensus on the nature of
conservatism.
Roger Scruton thus uses the apt term ‘inarticulate’ to
describe conservatism. Noel O’Sullivan calls it ‘a limited
style of politics’ and ‘philosophy of imperfection’. The
German Hans Mühlenfeld views as politics ‘without
ideals’ (‘ohne Wunschbilder’). For his part Russell Lewis
regards conservatives as dividing into practicalities and
leaving principles for the morrow. According to Lincoln
Allison the doctrine itself has been secondary importance
as compared to practical politics. He considers it as a
method rather than doctrine.3
Suvanto has concluded that conservatives thus have an outlook on life.
They do not need theory, because it is not been their radical intention to alter the
society. Conservatism has been criticized by not being effective theory compared
to liberalism and socialism4. Conservatism emerged as a reaction to a specific
historical moment, which played a determining role in its ambivalent
                                                          
3 Suvanto, Conservatism from French Revolution to the 1990s, p.2
4 Ibid., p.2
7characteristics. Conservatism is not an ideology in the ordinary sense of the term.
The paradox here is that it is a theory, which rejects theory. 5
On the other hand Nisbet6 defined conservatism as an ideology, since it
satisfied the determining features of being ideology. Nisbet took ideology as a
coherent body of moral, economic, social, and cultural ideas that had solid and
well–known reference to politics and political power, more specifically to a power
base to make possible a victory for a body of ideas.7 According to Nisbet, an
ideology is not over passing configuration of opinion; it lingers on for a
considerable time; and it has advocates and spokesmen, leading to a fair degree of
institutionalization. An ideology is associated with practical politics through
politicians, political parties and as well as books, articles. According to Nisbet
when the evaluation of these characteristics of ideology was made, it could be
concluded that conservatism was an ideology8.
According to the central thesis of left–oriented scholars, conservatism
emerged as an ideology in reaction to the French Revolution. According to them it
was this counter–reaction that explained the whole essence of ideology.
Conservatism is often taken as an ideology, which is related to tradition.
However, to Mannheim,9 traditionalism and conservatism are not synonymous
phenomena. Traditionalism is concerned merely with turning the clock back to an
earlier era, and to replicating in the present the attitudes and institutions of that
                                                          
5 Vincent, Andrew. Modern Political Ideologies Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1992, p.82
6 Nisbet, Robert., Conservatism Dream and Reality, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1986, p.vii
7 Ibid.,p.vii
8 Ibid., p. viii
9 Cited in Pekka Suvanto Conservatism from French Revolution to the 1990’s, p.3
8era10. Conservatism is a political and social movement. It adapts itself to new type
of solutions. According to Samuel Huntington11, conservatism is a non–ideational
ideology whose substance is the articulate, systematic, and theoretical resistance
to change.
Its impact on the political thought made conservatism closer to the
ideology rather than simply stating that it was an outlook. On the other hand it
should also be stated that conservatism has been least effective ideology in the
mobilization of masses in the political participation compared to other ideologies
such as communism and liberalism.
Defining Characteristics of Conservatism
Quinton12 has noted that conservatism could be understood around three
principles: traditionalism, having to do with attachment to familiar institutions
and hostility to revolutionary or like change. Organicism, that a society is a
natural whole, giving its members their identities. Political skepticism, or placing
emphasis on accumulated experience. According to the latter, political wisdom
was not found in speculative theories but in the historically accumulated
experience of the community. This wisdom came from tradition, custom, and
institutions.
                                                          
10 Davies, Stephan and Nigel, Ashford. A Dictionary of Conservative and Libertarian Thought,
1991, p.265
11 Cited in Nancy S. Love Dogmas and Dreams: Political ideologies in the Modern World. p: 106
12 Cited in Tod Honderich, Conservatism p. 212
9Conservatism has its rationale in the concept of the community and of
“desert” principle. In the former, wisdom comes from tradition, custom, and
institutions. The latter indicates that each individual should get what he/she
deserved on account of his/her personal qualities or his/her actions and activities.
Conservatism, being challenging attitude, is considered to make the
outcome of “progress” more positive. By being reactionary to the extremes of
liberalism, conservatism helped the development of liberalism in a healthier
manner. Conservative criticism of the philosophy of progress, which was related
to modernization phenomena, had been functioned in a more progressive and
positive way.
Although it had arisen against modernization and against change,
conservatism was a modern way of thinking. Conservatism as a modern
phenomenon changed its character according to modernization process.
Conservative politics correlates to the forces of property and the modalities of
modernization.
As noted, conservatism is usually associated with its stand against
change. However, conservatism can not be interpreted solely as the preservation
of status quo. It is because conservatism does not oppose to change; it posits that
change should take place as a “reform”. According to conservative thinking, the
reason behind it is that too radical a change alters the substance of the objects
themselves and removes their essence and significance. Too radical a change
alters what is fundamental; reform alters what is not fundamental. This view of
10
conservative thinking was well stated by Honderich13 as “change alters the
essential good, while reform remedies the evil”. Reform is not a change in
substance or in the primary modification of the objects, but direct application of a
remedy to the grievance complained of. Innovating is not reforming. The French
revolutionists complained of everything and they left nothing unchanged14. This
explains why conservatism had arisen as a criticism to French Revolution. These
statements make clear that conservatism is not against change but against the
destabilizing effects of change, which are associated with the alteration of the
essence.
The role of religion gains significance by being an inescapable and
undeniable part of societal stability and political authority. Also the meaning of
religion in conservatism arises from its being a bond of strength in uniting society.
Due to its bounding effect, conservatism attributes importance to religious signs
and rituals. Conservatism is unique among the other political ideologies for the
emphasis it placed upon the church. Religion is seeing as having a vital role in
societal harmony and equilibrium. The deterioration of this balance would lead to
derangement.  Religion for conservatism is something public and institutional and
a valuable pillar of both state and society, but not a profound doctrine, at least of
all a total experience15.  It is religion as civil religion that seems to be the closest
to a common essence of conservative belief, religion in which a transcendental
core manifests itself in civil as well as religious garments.
                                                          
13 Honderich, Tod. Conservatism. San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990, p.8
14 Tod, Conservatism, p.8
15 Lipset, Martin S. Conservatism, 1986 pp.68, 73
11
In respect to nationalism, conservatism has an ambivalent and changing
attitude. In the initial stages of the conservatism, as a reaction to French
Revolution, conservatives were against the nationalism, which was one of the
tendencies that had become visible after the Revolution. This was because
conservatism was restricted into the sphere of being aristocratic movement in
order to preserve their position. However, in the following decades especially
after the flourishing of the Industrial Revolution, which had reshaped the power
relations and gave rise to a major tension between bourgeoisie and workers,
nationalism became one of the indispensable elements of conservative thinking.
As Nigel and Davies16 have noted, the conservative, now, is likely to see
many of the moments constitutive of the nationalistic vision – religious and
linguistic unity, common traditions, shared loyalties, feeling of common identity,
etc. – as well as their associated images and symbols as important sources of
value in their own right.
Conservatism was not simply as anti–modern movement but a dialectical
counterpart to political modernization (democratization, political emancipation,
self-government, equal rights, etc.). It became mobilized during the process of
differentiation and accelerated change. In that respect, Minkenberg17 has
distinguished between two forms of conservatism.  One of them represented the
resistance toward radical change in the socio–political system. The other took
necessary and even radical steps of systematic adaptation in order to maintain its
                                                          
16 Davies and Nigel, A Dictionary of Conservative and Libertarian Thought, p.181
17 Minkenberg, Micheal. The New Right in Comparative Perspective: the USA and Germany,
Cornell Studies in International Affairs Western Societies Papers #32, Ithaca, New York, 1993, p.6
12
principles in the existing power structures. Due to the fact that conservatism could
not be reduced to so–called eternal conservative values but as a type of
“situational ideology”, it must be specified within historical conflict
constellations. With the nationalist revolutions of the rising bourgeoisie during the
19th century, conservatism involved the upper classes against the liberalism. With
Industrial Revolution a new cleavage emerged in which the bourgeoisie and
remnants of the old order united against the workers’ movement and demands for
political participation and economic redistribution. “Left” became associated with
lower classes and the allied elite that strove to change society in a more self
governing, egalitarian direction, whereas “Right” was associated with maintaining
and defending the status–quo that was also defended by  the liberal bourgeoisie
order.
13
CHAPTER TWO
EUROPEAN CONSERVATISM
Historical Perspective on Conservatism
Conservatism became a distinct line of thought after the reference to
ideological world of Right by the early 19th century. But its philosophical birth
came into being with Reflections on the Revolution in France, which was written
by Edmund Burke. Edmund Burke emphasized the importance of traditions,
institutions, and evolutionary change as opposed to the individualism and abstract
ideas with artificially designed political systems18. In its initial stages
conservatism put emphasis on the dangers of revolution that would radically
disturbe the traditional balances of Europe.
Although conservatism has been usually associated with French
revolution, the emergence of conservative attitudes could be traced back to 14th
century. At the time, the aristocrats and the landowners, because of losing their
effectiveness in preserving the status quo initiated conservatism. However, in the
following periods conservatism did not linger on.
                                                          
18  Robertson, Davies. The Penguin Dictionary of Politics. London: Penguin Books, 1993, p.107
14
What made the French revolution as a threshold for conservatism?
French revolution brought formal equality, or “legal equality”, which signified
that all men were equal before law. This led to the abolishment of all titles
regarding nobility, and taxation on an equal base.  With these developments, the
position of aristocracy fell into danger and pushed them to efforts to preserve of
the status quo.
Edmund Burke is accepted as the founder of the conservatism. According
to Burke, radical change was always wrong. He criticized rights given to
individuals and the declining position of church and monarch.
In Reflections on the Revolution in France19, Burke outlined his basic
views. First, society was not a merely contract on the other hand it was a moral
order. Second, in keeping with this, history, not nature was the determinant of the
rights. Third, humanity was largely irrational. Our survival and our success
depended on the accumulated wisdom of generations. For this reason, tradition
and authority, better yet, traditional authorities should guide politics. Fourth,
humanity was also imperfect, marred by original sin. Fifth, equality (except in an
ultimate moral sense) was unreasonable. Equality violated the natural hierarchy of
wisdom and virtue. Sixth, politics required prudence. Society was complex, and
change had hidden costs. Citizens should moderate their demands, and reformers
should conserve and correct. According to Burke, British and American
revolutions, unlike the French Revolution, achieved this balance.
                                                          
19 Burke, Edmund. “Reflections on the Revolution in France” in Nancy S. Love, (eds.) Dogmas
and Dreams: Political Ideologies in the Modern World, New Jersey: Chamtam House Publishers,
1991, pp: 133–145
15
A counter–revolution was undertaken by the aristocratic and clerical
leaders of the old regime. The resistance to the French revolution tended to come
from backward areas of France. There, the reforming values of the liberal
bourgeoisie had barely penetrated20.  Also it was claimed that “the revolution was
made for the wealthy bourgeoisie and therefore, only they get the benefits of the
new regime”. So peasantry and artisans also joined to counter revolutionary
movements.
Napoleon consolidated all liberal gains and exported them to his new
empire. The examples of those gains were the abrogation of feudal dues and
serfdom, the abolishment of privileges of aristocracy and taxation according to
wealth.
On the other parts of Europe, especially in Prussia ultra conservatives
were in power. Of all European states, Prussia played a leading role in the history
of European conservatism. Prussia unified Germany in the late 19th century under
the leadership of ultra–conservatives21. Napoleon was defeated by the Holy
Alliance, which was formed by Prussia, Russia and Austria.
These developments were continued because of the dominance of
romanticism, which was primarily used to denote the artistic and cultural
movement began in the 18th century Europe in terms of political ideology. Then a
restoration period was started. In France, for example, the legislation of the
                                                          
20 Weiss, John. Conservatism in Europe 1770 – 1945 Traditionalism, Reaction and Counter-
Revolution, London: Thames and Hudson, 1977, p.24
21 Ibid., p.28
16
restoration was in favor of conservatives, but a compromise with the more liberal
consensus had to be made.
In the second half of the 19th century, new social conditions forced
conservatives to break with many of the policies of the ultras. Adjustments were
made and nationalism became an intense and popular emotion among ever larger
groups of population. Conservatives also encouraged imperialism abroad and thus
the economic exploitation of the resources.
Conservatives were willing to adopt dynamic policies for two basic
sources of power in Western civilization, which were national unity and industrial
expansion. These sources might be manipulated by the rule of pre–liberal and
pre–industrial elite. The first statesman to demonstrate this was the most dynamic
new conservative of them all, Bismarck in Germany. Germany was to be first
powerful industrial state, being dominated by institutions and values, which
flourished in the pre–liberal and pre–industrial past.
The period 1789–1914 is often taken as heyday of conservative thought
and practices22. The conservative ideology in the 19th century was characterized
by number of negative themes. Conservatives in that century had an ambivalent
attitude towards industrialization and the rise of liberal political economy. There
was a strong anti-industrial, anti–individualistic strain in conservatism.
Industrialization and individualism meant the decline of community, tradition,
order and religion.
                                                          
22 Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies p.61
17
At the end of the 19th century a turning point in the conservatism was
witnessed as conservatism was now associated with radical right politics.
According to Weiss23, conservatives were to make a choice between being
defenders of capitalism or turning to radical politics. Nationalism became one of
the dominant aspects of this radical right. The goal of ‘integral nationalism’, as it
had been called, was to intensify the passions and hatreds generated by popular
nationalism and to direct the energies thus released to the support of a wide range
of ultra–conservative principles. In the last analysis these ultra-nationalist
movements and rapid industrialization led to the emergence of World War I. It
was realized that there would always be a tendency toward radical right.
In the 20th century with the emergence of new right policies especially in
Britain and in USA with Thatcherism and Reageanism, it was witnessed that
conservatism took on a moderate position compared to the previous radical right
approach. Nonetheless, the political success of Conservative Party in Britain in
the 20th century had been based on its ability to adapt and find modus vivendi with
industrial and democratic ethos24. Neo–conservatism had emerged and it was
conceptualized as populist neo–conservative reactions to fundamental changes in
culture and values in Western societies. It was not simply the revival of the
traditional conservatism in the old politics sense but a new coalition of forces,
which saw their common enemy in the post materialist New Left, and its political
agenda25. New Left is a political tendency emerging among Marxists during the
                                                          
23 Weiss, Conservatism in Europe 1770–1945 Traditionalism, Reaction and Counter–Revolution,
p. 103
24 Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies, p.61
25 Minkenberg, The New Right in Comparative Perspective: the USA and Germany, p.6
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1950s, associated with an increasing disenchantment with bolshevism and its
offshoots26.
Robertson27 has indicated the four themes of neo–conservatism as follows:
first neo–conservatives supported Western values and were hostile to
communism. Secondly, they were skeptical about the role of government in social
life. Thirdly, they had strong traditionalist approach towards the issues of religion
and morality. Finally they opposed the broad vision of equality such as
affirmative action and quotas.
In the 20th century, conservative thought was preoccupied with the
problems of revolution and constitutional government, and democracy and
progress. It was also concerned with the establishment of a firm foundation for
individual liberty against the challenges of socialism and libertarianism.
“Libertarianism” is the form of liberalism, which believes in freeing people not
merely from the constraints of traditional political institutions, but also from the
constraints imposed by their mistaken attribution of power to ineffectual things.28
This orientation was informed by a heightened concern with such socio–cultural
values and issues as nationalism and ethnocentrism, law and order, family,
religion and bourgeoisie morality.
All conservative and neo–liberal movements, that have emerged in North
America and in Europe since 1960’s is called the new right. Those movements are
divided into two pillars as neo–liberal and neo–conservative29.
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Plurality of Conservatisms
Vincent30 has argued that there are three broad approaches to the study of
conservatism: the historical nation–state, chronological, and conceptual
approaches. According to the historical nation–state approach to conservatism can
be classified in terms of the particular historical and cultural circumstances of the
nation–state in which it has developed. Thus, conservatism could be analyzed as
German conservatism, British conservatism, or French conservatism. This
allowed one to take into account the peculiar characteristics of the specific context
within which conservatism has developed and thus account for different
conservatisms.
This approach is important for the purpose of the present essay. For in
this essay, we wish to study Turkish conservatism in comparison with European
conservatisms.
French Conservatism
French conservatism is characterized with a religious and moralistic
vision of world, which is related to eternal religious verities and order. French
conservatism was a counter revolutionary movement as it was in the other
European countries. However, the significance of French conservatism was that a
revolution took place in France. In the 19th century, in France conservatism
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launched an attack on the principles and practices of the Revolution, which was
based on certain assumptions about the nature of man and political society. The
French revolution affirmed two basic values; liberty and equality, the counter–
revolution opposed them with their opposites, authority and inequality. Counter
revolutionists that were monarchist respected the authority of God, the king and
the noble; the latter constituted a single principle of hierarchy. The conservatives
in France attacked rationality, universality, and democracy.
Similar to other conservative movements in Europe, conservatism started
in France as a reactionary movement of aristocracy, due to the lessening of their
effectiveness on political, social and economical arenas. The French revolution
made everybody equal before law. Republic was made secure against the
pretensions of aristocratic dynasties old and new to govern as a class or at least, to
occupy an exalted position in the hierarchies of society. In the process, the church
and state, alongside and frequently intermarried with the great bourgeoisie
dynasties31.  The middle class occupied the commanding position of the French
economy for more than a century and the character of the modern nation as a
whole had been broadly determined by this ascendancy. Middle class in France
supported the revolutionary movement. French revolution attacked on the church
and secularized a large amount of the church’s possession. It challenged the
authority of the Pope and priest.
It was the acceptance of the principle of authority, which finally brought
together Catholicism and the counter–revolutionary aristocratic thought. The
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counter–revolutionary thought in France regarded itself officially as Catholic in
essence and declared the necessity of inequality.
The civil constitution of the clergy marked a turning point.
It sealed the alliance of the Church and the counter–
revolution, but it divided France. From now onwards two
pairs of opposing principle confronted to each other. On
the Catholic and counter revolutionary side, with splendid
unanimity, the necessity of authoritarian principle was
affirmed and likewise the importance of the idea of
inequality, albeit with some reservations on the Catholic
side. On the revolutionary side the values of both equality
and liberty were defended without misgivings. Church
also divided into two with 1789. Some accepted civil
constitution which destroyed Church and others rejected it.
Geography was the potent factor in these choices. This is
called ‘map of secularity’ or ‘map of dechristinization’32.
The end of the 19th century signified a turning point that Catholics rallied
on Republicanism. The Catholic Right in France survived but became republican.
Republican environment by definition was not a bad solution of the survival and
defence of Catholicism, which remained strong but enjoyed only a minority
status. Catholic Right became the classical right within the context of France33.
Paris was the center of revolutionary activities, whereas the West, the
South West, the extreme North were the dominant places in terms of church
resistance to revolution. As it was stated by Todd, the post–revolutionary period
was a phase of recovery and reestablishment in Catholicism, however, the
Catholicism, which survived the Revolution was not the Catholicism of the
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ancient regime. Catholic Right appeared and became the classical Right in the
French context. In France, there had been obvious resemblance between the
picture of the Right and the map of Catholicism.
As in the case geographical distinction between revolutionary and
counter revolutionary positions, the family system of France, which correlated
with the map of political tendencies, was also effective in the shaping of
conservative attitudes. The family system was the carrier of inegalitarian ideals
and correlated with aristocracy. Todd34 signified this position of aristocracy as
follows: “aristocratic primogeniture encourages the myth of blue blood”. With
Dreyfus affair, the myth of race began to influence the French Catholicism. This
supported the anti–Semitic characteristic of French conservatism and this anti–
Semitic position was based on the belief in the inequality of races. The
nationalistic character of French conservatism evinced itself in its anti–Semantic
attitude.
For conservatives, the “Jew” was not a specific person at whom certain
charges were made. On the contrary, the “Jew” was for them as ideogram, which
served as shorthand for certain attitudes and doctrines of which they disapproved.
For Maurras, the ideas of liberty and democracy were “Jewish”, corrupted finance
was “Jewish”, the rights of man were “Jewish”, all that threatens of France were
“Jewish”. “Jewish” meant rotten, foreign, democratic, anti–clerical, anti–militarist
and Marxist35.
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Conservatives in France attacked o the “sovereignty of people”, which
was seen as the cause of anarchy when it was used against the existing
government, and as tyranny when used as the intellectual support of a popular
regime. This view on sovereignty of people was developed by Taine36 who was
one of the important conservative intellectuals. According to Taine, it was this
particular obsession of Jacobins with idées fixes – the rights of man, popular
sovereignty and social contract – that was responsible for all the troubles, which
France suffered from since 1789. This theme was dominant among the
conservative intellectuals in the French history up to 1914. In the words of Mc
Clelland37 as “some of them, like Taine, blamed the history, others like Drumont,
blamed the Jews. Le Bon blamed the masses and so did Sorel, but with a fine
impartiality included bourgeoisie as well”.
It is apparent that the French conservatism was not a unified counter
revolutionary movement. As it could be seen from their attitudes and responses to
the instability in France, conservative intellectuals had different views. Although
French conservatism could not be conceptualized as a single and identical attitude,
there were nevertheless common points, which all conservatives adhered.
French conservatism was against the rationality of man and put emphasis
on the theory of society and history, which lied stress on those aspects of political
and social development. To the conservatives political and social developments
were independent of the human will and reason, due to the fact that rational elite
                                                          
36 Cited  in J.S. Mc Clelland The French Right from Maistre to Maurras, p. 21
37Mc Clelland, The French Right from Maistre to Maurras, p. 26
24
was making judgements for the irrational mass. The position of French
conservatism on change derived from an organic view of society. They opposed
the reconstruct society according to abstract principles since society was not a
machine but an organism that developed slowly and gradually adapted to the
environment. According to French conservatives what was natural was historical;
people did not have to meet together to make a social contract by common
consent because the very fact that they were born into established polities
presupposed a real, positive contract. The ideas such as popular sovereignty could
lead to the destruction of the real contract, which was not the work of single man,
or even of a generation of men, but of whole race and generation.
French conservatism was defined by Mc Clelland38 as “reactionary
right”. For many people, the term ‘reactionary right’ conjured up images of the
past, in particular declining social groups, unable come to terms with the legacy of
the Enlightenment and more specifically the French revolution. Being radical
meant being prepared to dig up the roots; being reactionary in a country with an
entrenched radical tradition meant much of the same thing39. Conservatives and
reactionaries both shared a fascination with the past and a repository of
fundamental wisdom. French conservatism directed severe criticisms to the
republican regime due to its failure to be consolidated in France. France could not
achieve stable politics due to the deficiencies the political party system.
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For a long time, French conservatism remained the influence of the
Restoration movement that aimed a return to the monarchy and to a life that were
governed by a religious world view. Between 1881 and 1980 everywhere in
France, a dualist opposition between Right and Left was developed and lingered
on. It was a religious, Catholic conservatism40. French conservatives distinguished
between pays legal and the pays reel.41 The former referred to the structure of the
political and judicial institutions and the agencies that were designed to enforce
the authority, or what was collectively known as state. The latter indicated the true
sentiments or spirit of people expressed in traditional observances and social
relations.
German Conservatism
German conservatism tended towards to a metaphysical and historical
vision, which emphasized a strong philosophical theory of history. Compared to
other major European countries, Germany modernized late. This fact could be
explained by two reasons. First one was up until the late 18th century there was a
“lack of unity” that hindered economic and political development in Germany.
Secondly, in Germany no political revolution followed Enlightenment. The old
aristocracy in connection with the monarch and the army effectively prevented the
formulation of policies that stimulate economic expansion.
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This could be explained by ‘why has Germany been always recognized
as conservative?’ According to Beiser42 conservatism always existed in Germany
as a “social attitude” but after the 1790s it began to develop as an “intellectual
force”. This mutation in conservative outlook was the consequence of the fact that
conservatism in that country had existed since the 1770s in opposition to doctrines
of enlightenment, however with reaction against Revolution it became much more
self–conscious and coherent movement. The reason behind this change in
conservative attitudes in Germany resulted from the fear that Germany might
suffer from the same chaos, terror, and bloodshed that France had experienced.
Being “intellectual force” was achieved through provision of opposition to the
doctrines of liberals and romantics and the domination of the intellectual
atmosphere of the Restoration.
German conservatism did not arise as a reaction to Enlightenment. It
opposed the ideology of Revolution, and defended paternalism and the old social
hierarchy.
In the 18th century, conservatism was a very heterogeneous body of
opinion in Germany. It was necessary to discuss this heterogeneity in conservative
thinking in order to signify its position in Germany. Despite the fact that all
conservatives were anxious to preserve the “hierarchical social order” they did not
agree on the value and the need of reforming it. There were great disparities in
“political principles”. Some conservatives approved such liberal values as equality
of opportunity, religious tolerance, and freedom of press. Others tended toward
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authoritarian policies, emphasizing the need for religious uniformity, press
censorship, and a stiff punitive code. In addition to these differences, among
conservatives there was no unity on the ‘type of constitution or ideal form of
government’. Some believed in enlightened absolutism, while others defended the
old “standeestaat”, as a bulwark against such despotism. On the last issue there
was a distinction between “absolutist” and “estatist” conservatives in the 18th
century.  What united the conservatives despite these differences on ideal form of
government was their loyalty to old paternalism43.
In the 18the century, conservatives agreed on some other common
themes and arguments. One such theme was opposition to political rationalism. In
other words they were opposed to reconstructing society according to abstract
principles since society was not a machine but an organism that developed slowly
and adapted to the environment. Second such theme among conservatives was
related to the human nature, which was not considered as inherently good and
perfectible, if restrictions had been removed. Related to this argument, they were
against the popular sovereignty. Third common point was criticism of
egalitarianism. In addition to political equality, conservatives had an ambivalent
attitude towards economic and social equality. As Beiser44 has noted, some
conservatives reacted against radical change primarily because they believed that
the demand for political equality would bring economic equality and communal
ownership of goods. Another common theme among German conservatives was
related to the critique of liberal individualism. Rather than viewing society as a
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collection of distinct individuals who were held together through abstract norms
and principles, conservatives regarded society as an organic whole joined by the
ties of tradition, custom, and sentiments. Conservatives were convinced that “in
order to reach higher stages of development, greater or lesser restrictions on
personal development were necessary” and that mutual dependence was “the only
cohesive factor in society”.45
The dominance of romantic attitudes in the German case supported the
definition of Vincent46 of German conservatism as romantic conservatism.
Romantic conservatism indicated a strong nostalgia for an idealized pastoral,
rural, quasi–feudal past, often combined with a well–worked–out utopian vision
of what that restored society should look like. They disliked the alienation and
dehumanization of mechanistic industrial culture and were deeply critical of the
view of humanity expressed through the commercial mentality.
Prussian conservatism was the most influential among others in shaping
German conservatism. Prussian conservatism had its imprint on the character of
German conservatism during the empire and Weimar Republic.
As noted above German conservatives were not anti–Aufklarer, just
conservative Aufklarer. Due to that reason, for some German conservatives, for
instance the Hannoverian School, which was one of the most important bodies of
conservative thought, the English constitution seemed to be the perfect mean
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between the two of the most important pressing dangers of modern political life:
the popular democracy and absolute despotism. In addition to these also they were
interested in the social, political, and economic issues taking place in England
whose strengths they wanted to emulate and whose problems they wanted to
avoid. Therefore England served as a model for the solution of potential social
problems.
In German conservatism Junkers, a landed aristocracy with only regional
functions and traditional privileges of descent in the army, the diplomatic service,
and public administration, played an important role. It has been thought that in the
18th and the19th centuries conservative ideas and organizations served to the
Junker interests exclusively47. The “Agrarian League” (Bund der Landwrite–BdL)
usually had been included in Junkers. The BdL was identified as a radical, unitary
and, all–powerful interest group that manipulated German farmers and peasants
into supporting conservative, that is, Junker–oriented political and economic aims.
According to Eley48, BdL aimed at the growth of autonomous small farmer
activity in most parts of Germany, the development of political anti–Semitism
with a Christian Social current inside the Conservative Party, and general attempts
to form a new right–wing party after the fall of Bismarck.
In terms of middle class politics two main streams can be recognized.
One of the streams was constituted by idealists and liberalists and the other one
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was composed of conservative nationalists. Both groups aimed at the unification
of Germany through peaceful means. Through a series of emancipation
movements a change in power relations of many diverse groups had inevitably
brought a widespread feeling of uncertainty. According to Elias49 this uncertainty
gave way to conservative attitudes. Although the conservative nationalist middle
class members had a secondary role in the affairs of state they who whole
heartedly identified themselves with the Reich and its order. In contrast to the
declining liberal and humanist trends they represented the rise of nationalist trend
in Germany. The conservative nationalists became stronger, and gave higher place
to an ideal image of state and nation in their self–image and their scale of values.
The German conservatism and the relationship between aristocracy and middle
class have been explained by Elias as follows:
The unification of Germany had been achieved through
military victories over rival states. The leadership in these
struggles lied in the hands of nobility. Middle class played
second – rank political role and they were mostly excluded
from the highest positions of command. However middle
class did not satisfy with this and had fought in some way
or another against the supremacy of the courts and
aristocracy. That the national victory under the leadership
of the court and military aristocracy implied the social
defeat of German middle class in the domestic struggle
against the supremacy of the nobility. Many members of
the German Middle class now gave up the domestic
struggle against the hegemony of nobility. They
acquiesced in their position as a social stratum of the
second rank. In its place there occurred in other segments
of the middle class especially the higher civil service and
entire academic world, an adoption of aristocratic values
such as warlike values and socially inherited
understanding the meaning of power potentials in the
interstate play of strength50.
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In the beginning of the 20th century there were three right–wing parties in
the Germany. One of them was the German Conservative Party (Deutsche–
Konservative Partie or DKP); the other was the Imperial and Free Conservative
Party (Reichs–und Frei Konservative Partie or FKP) and the National Liberal
Party (Nationalliberale Partie or NLP)51. The DKP was the most rightist party.
Conservative parties had a common aim, which was to unite against Left or
socialism. On the other hand the National Liberals saw themselves in a two–front
war against radicals on the left and right.
However the experience of the World War I, the collapse of empire and its
replacement by a republic with democracy and egalitarian aspirations placed the
proponents of the traditionalism clearly on the defensive side. This gave way to a
new form of thinking among the conservatives. Germanic Kultur was seen as
firmly rooted in the people. Both liberal capitalism and Marxist socialism were
regarded as artificial constructs. The multi–faced crisis confronting Germany
could therefore be explained as a result of de–coupling of nation and culture. Thus
the notion of redemption through culture was close to conservatives52.
As compared to French conservatism, German conservatism tended
towards a more metaphysical and historical vision, which emphasized a strong
philosophical theory of history. As different from French example of
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conservatism Germany did not experience a revolution and therefore, its
conservatism did not arise as a reaction to the effects fundamental change.
German conservatism was defined by Woods53 as “radical right”. The whole
existing social order was decadent and has to be removed. The position has been
summed up by Muller as “a revolt against existing institutions in the name of
authority”.54
Radical policies were effective in Germany in the time period that
capitulated two world wars. The reason behind it could be traced to the failure in
the World War I. It caused the rejection of the present and an inability to
formulate a genuinely new political stance, both contributing to the rise of
activism within the radical right55. In addition to the economic instability, rapid
development of industry, which caused anxiety, was also effective in the rise of
radical politics in Germany. Conservative revolution, which had taken place
against the French revolution, prepared the ground for National Socialism
movement. In short–term, the conservative trend was associated with the national
socialism, but, in the long–term it constituted a bridge between German
conservatism and classical conservatism – conservatism that arose as a reaction
against the French revolution in France – and capitalism.
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British Conservatism
The predominant mode of British conservatism was quiet and defensive.
Even when it was loud and assertive, it more frequently rallied to the defense of
the old interests than to promulgation of new doctrines. In this sense, British
conservatism differed from combative conservatism of the continental Europe56.
Although British conservatism had a defensive characteristic, it had never
suffered from its critics anymore than a slight to the pre–eminence of its values.
Conservatism in Britain had been developed in response to events
external to itself. It had been a reaction to some of the great transformations. The
first reaction was French Revolution and democracy. Disagreements were
principally social, cultural, and political rather than economic. The second
reaction was against liberalism and industrial capitalism, which were seen as
morally atomistic and hence corrosive of social order and public responsibility. In
respect to liberalism and industrialism, British conservatism developed an
economic dimension. The economic stance, however, was one which denied
economic life any autonomy from the wider of society and which subordinated
economic conduct to the moral duties which its possession imposed.57 The third
reaction was to socialism, which developed in the last quarter of the 19th century
lacked specifically political dimension. According Barker58, each response made
the character of conservatism more complex and introduced further strands, far
from consistently into the overall wave. Specific to more moderate British
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conservatism compared to German and France examples, this process of
accumulation and adaptation has meant that doctrines which had seemed major
opponents of conservatism, at a later date were treated with sympathy or even
commendation when the principle threat or the most active antagonist was
detected.
In British conservatism, social order was to be maintained by tradition,
hierarchy, deference, and inequality. It was this order, which rested on the
preponderance of aristocracy in a mixed and inherited constitution, was defended
by Burke as a response to French Revolution and radicalization. The role of
representing the community as a whole, which in Old Tory thought belonged only
to the monarch, now belonged to the King, Lord and Commons in what was called
the “balanced constitution”.
The society, which British conservatives had defended against both the
revolution and liberalism, had been a public of noble and responsible leaders and
deferential masses. The defense against revolution and democracy after 1789
involved the consolidation of social order, deference and religion. The defense
against liberalism involved the consolidation of paternalism and aristocracy.
British conservatism stressed first the nation than the family as the expression of
deference and paternalism. For British conservatives the nation, which was the
highest level of association, was defined by tradition and established institutions
and values.
35
British conservatism had been associated with the established Protestant
Church. Religion for conservatives involved the recognition of a limited character
of all secular achievements and properly understood restrained ambitions for
worldly perfection59. But religion never occupied the same place in British
conservatism as in continental conservatism.
In British political system, Conservative Party, which has been called
Tories, was established. Conservative Party was more effective when compared to
Liberals (Whigs). Its policies, which were based on communalist and paternalist
tendencies made Conservative Party closer to the Labor Party. As Greenleaf has
noted:
On the wide range of issues, the views of many
conservatives were well–nigh indistinguishable from those
Liberals and even a good many people who call
themselves socialist. ...There had always been an ‘inherent
collectivism’ in British conservatism. Tories had never
been in history afraid to use of state and that Toriyism had
always been a form of paternal socialism60
Up until the 19th century British conservatism was supported by the rural
population and by a very small number of families of high position and wealth.
Then as compared with rural wealth, financial, industrial and commercial wealth
greatly increased its representation in party. As to Beer61, wealth, whether “old”
or “new” amalgamated its support for conservatism. After the 19th century, the
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political support of British conservative was transformed and began to enjoy a
wide following among the new middle–class electorate. The victories of the
Conservative Party between 1886–1890 would have been impossible without
massive support from “the lower order”, including the working class.
In the political success of Conservative Party, Primrose Tory League
played an important role. The reason behind it was the practical application of
class and rank as a unifying force in society. By accepting the class as a virtue not
as a matter for apology the League comfortably embraced the conservative view
of social unity. Its relationship with Conservative Party remained spiritually close
but organizationally loose. The Leagues dense network of social contacts
especially in the rural areas enabled it to mobilize the conservative vote efficiently
at elections.
A skeptical and empiricist vision, which was intellectually messy,
compromising and incoherent, but none the less politically more successful, had
observed. Aughey defined British conservatism as “moderate right”. There were
two major usages of moderate conservatism emphasized by Aughey62. The first
one implied a definition applied by political opponents to those features of
thought and practice of an opposing ideology congenial to their own objectives
and practices. Secondly, moderation commonly referred to a condition or style of
politics which predisposed the advocate of this style to always seek the middle
way between the extremes of ideologies. However, for British case, moderation
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implied political thought and practice rooted in the recognition of the
correspondence between the legal and political order of the state and customs on
the one hand, and sentiments of the people on the other.
Its geographical position permitted Britain to develop its own tradition
peculiar to itself without been affected by the authoritarian militarism in Europe.
The nature of British polity was the outcome of the interactions between
conservative, liberal and socialist values. A mosaic of policy since the 1945 has
generally been laid on the firm foundation of common political thought.
Conservatism63 in Britain was not the effect of the purely conservative
tendencies, which disposed one to the safety and familiarity of the known.
Instead, it was like a great river “the waters of which come from many converging
streams”.64 Lord Hugh put emphasis on the adaptability of the British
conservatism. As a result, compared to French and German conservatism British
conservatism had a moderate character. That conservatism had less tendency to
radical right politics. These characteristics of British conservatism were related to
political tradition of Britain.
French conservatism was attached initially to a more religious and
moralistic vision of world, appealing to eternal religious verities and order.
German conservatism, by contrast, tended towards a more metaphysical and
historical vision (romanticism) which emphasized a strong philosophical theory of
history. British conservatism had a skeptical and empiricist vision, which was
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intellectually messy, compromising and less coherent, but none the less in the end
more politically more successful.
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CHAPTER THREE
TURKISH CONSERVATISM
Conservatism in Turkey, was one of the issues that was usually
correlated with Nationalism or/and Islamism. To discuss Turkish conservatism
and to compare it with its European counterparts, the question that ‘Could one talk
about Turkish conservatism as a separate entity?’ should be answered. The
differences of Turkish conservatism from Islamist and nationalist tendencies
should be studied. Discussion on the existence of Turkish conservatism may be
made through the analysis of the conceptualization of Turkish conservatism in
Tanıl Bora, and Süleyman Seyfi Öğün; in the last decade both wrote extensively
on the issue of Turkish conservatism.
Presence of Turkish Conservatism?
Bora65 proposed that Conservatism, Nationalism and Islamism are like
phases of matter as solid, liquid, and gas rather than positions. He tried to
conceptualize nationalism, conservatism and Islamism as existing forms of
Turkish Right, each of which could transform from one to the other. Nationalism
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was perceived as solid phase of Turkish Right, because nationalism constituted
the grammar of Turkish Right. Islamism was conceptualized as liquid phase of
Turkish Right since Islamism was one of the most blessed sources of means,
values, images and rituals of Turkish Right. Conservatism was a kind of posture
and perception; it was a style and a gas form of Turkish Right. According to, Bora
“conservatism was the major position in Turkish Right in coping with
modernization”66. Conservatism, except the Western experiences, was developed
under the sing of traditionalism, which indicated going back to essential character
of authentic civilization. Conservatism in non–Western countries, proposes a
response to modernization processes and challenges coming from the Western
civilization. Reaction in the name of traditionalism emerged as an effort to reform
religion. Modernization and reformation in religion led to interaction between
religious ideology and nationalism at least in the case Islamic world67. As to Bora,
romantic–conservatism is the best phrase to define conservatism in non–Western
world.
According to Öğün conservatism was not ‘preservatism’; conservatism
was associated with change which was indispensable element of community in
order to survive. In other words, community as an organism had to adapt to its
environment in order to survive. Change did not represent a radical break from the
roots; it flourished as a moderate passage. Öğün gives British Revolution was as
an example of this kind of moderate change.
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Öğün explained conservatism as tension between political sphere and
civic sphere. It was a tension between ‘progressive republican ethic’ and
‘conservative ethic’68. In progressive republican ethic, paternalistic state,
citizenship, and loyalty to the state were emphasized. In conservative ethic, the
stress was on an ethical individual. According to Öğün conservatism tried to
decrease tension between these spheres. That was tension between state and civil
society could only be reduced if a harmony could be achieved between cultural
values and political action.
At first glance conservatism and republicanism seem to be
in a sharp conflict with respect to priorities. Whilst the
former represents the pays légal which denotes the
structure of political and judicial institutions divorced
from their historical ties and designed to enforce the
authority; the latter champions pays réel which denotes
some civilities such as property and family, as the spirit of
a people expressed in traditional observances, pieties and
social relations ...it is this paternalistic mentality, common
to both republicanism and conservatism, which has
enabled the Turkish conservative to reinterpret and mollify
Kemalistic political themes in favor of his pre–political
assumptions.69
Conservative ethic, which was shaping force of Turkish Right, and
republican ethic were not as conflicting as they seemed when they their emergent
points evaluated. Öğün perceived conservatism as a moderator between the
tension in the civic and political spheres. Conservatism could not be associated
with nationalism and Islamism, because conservatism wanted to achieve balance
and it was not as reactionary as it seemed.
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There has been a tendency to associate conservatism with nationalistic
and/or religious approaches. However, the conservatives wanted to achieve
moderation in modernization process rather than reshaping the system according
to nationalist and/or religious doctrines. Nationalism and Islamism found a place
in the discourse of conservatism to the extent to which they were part of tradition
and culture. Conservatism was a modern phenomenon.
Emergence of Turkish Conservatism
As already noted, in its initial stages of development in Europe,
conservatism gained its concrete meaning through being reactionary to the ideas
spread in the aftermath of French revolution. It was developed as a defensive
attitude of the aristocrats due to losing their status and effectiveness. Like the
French example, Turkish conservatism developed as a modernization movement.
Turkish conservatism was a product of republic and guaranteed and developed
itself on the idea developed by the republic. As in other non–Western countries,
conservative experience was developed against the modernization movement,
which aimed at reaching civilized countries. It was a call for traditionalism.
Conservative attitudes were directed against the bureaucratic and militaristic
intelligentsia who played a significant role in the institutionalization of the
reforms undertaken by the republic.
Turkish conservatism had its roots in the in the 18th century, when the
first reforms were made. The dilemma between the supporters of Westernization,
or modernization, who constituted the center, and conservatives, who were
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defenders of the status quo gained significance after the launching of the
Tanzimat, or reform period.70 As Berkes71 has shown, in the reformation period of
Ottoman Empire modernization movements first applied to military system. In
traditional Ottoman system, the janissaries had a very significant place in terms of
both the military and administration. With the reforms the janissaries started to
lose their effectiveness. They thus began to tend toward conservative attitudes.
After the janissaries, the members of religious institution went through the same
transformation. In the following periods with the deepening effects of the reform
movements, conservatism gained more salience. Conservatives now wanted to
protect the position of Sultan as well as those of the traditional religious
institutions and opposed constitutional movements, which aimed to relegate into a
secondary the position of sultan and some other institutions that had played
important roles in the administration of the Ottoman Empire.
In the 19th century, Turkish conservatism experienced a structural
change. While in the 18th century it aimed at the preservation of traditional
balance between religion and the state that were dominant in the 19th century, it
aimed at the regeneration of political and cultural institutions regarding East and
the Islamic East dominant in the middle ages. This conservative outlook to some
extent continued in the early stages of the republican era.
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Karpat72 has stated that both conservatives and modernists used variety
of reference concepts regarding the different periods of modernization. Changes
in the attitudes of conservatives occurred according to the policies adapted in
Ottoman Empire in order to avoid the collapse of the empire. New ways had been
tried such as Islamism and nationalism. In accordance with these changes the
attitudes of conservatives went through a mutation. In the 19th century, more
Islamic tendencies, in the 20th century more nationalist tendencies dominated the
discourse of Turkish conservatism. For that reason the conflict between
modernists and conservatives could not be evaluated as a conflict between “old”
and “new”.  Also, Karpat has pointed out, during the modernization process
modern could become a conservative. Conservatism could be an attitude that was
adopted by the groups who lost effectiveness, status and power during the
modernization process; conservatism would also refer to traditionalist attitudes of
the groups that gained effectiveness, status and power.
This relativism in the interpretation of conservatism is well analyzed by
İrem:
Conservatism refers to religious groups that react to
coercive modernization and Westernization
process...cultural and political choices of middle class that
arose in the Republican period...life style and social habits
of secular groups who made cooperation with nationalist
and bureaucratic intelligentsia during the Independence
war...political inclinations of land owners and industrialist
who favor the continuation of rural relationships...social
and political choices of upper urbanized groups...political
views of opposition groups who defend the continuation of
traditional customs and habits as a way of independence in
the Ottoman and Republican Period...political views of
religious leaders that are dominant in the First
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Assembly...all social and political demands that are shaped
around religion to preserve traditional values...central
tendency of all big political parties in Turkey...protective
spiritual condition of religiously shaped nationalist
attitudes. 73
In 1920s and 1930s, Turkish conservatism was not opposed to Kemalism,
which has been the official ideology and of the Turkish Republic. However, the
main question in the minds of Turkish conservatives was how Kemalism or the
modernization project should have been formulated.
Due to limitations brought by the single–party politics, conservatives
could not be organized around a political organization such as a political party.
“Journalism”, where Turkish conservatives created discussion platforms on
several issues, was the common ground that Turkish conservatives expressed their
views. The most discussed issues in these journals were democracy, education,
history, custom, state, individual, nation, and the like. The Turkish conservatives’
nationalism was tinged with strong nationalism.
Turkish Conservatism, Center–Periphery Relations, and
“Just” and “Unjust”
In terms of understanding Turkish conservatives and conservatism in
Turkey, the center–periphery relations and the terms of just and unjust have a
particular significance. They were first used by Şerif Mardin in the study of
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Turkish politics. Mardin has examined center – periphery relations from Ottoman
Empire to the present. He has stated that the relationship between center and
periphery always remained conflictual. Ottoman Empire was a “two–tiered”
society. This structure could be explained through the dichotomies of folk versus
elite, palace culture (elite culture) versus folk culture (little culture), palace
language versus folk language, and Şeriat (by Kur’an) versus Kanun (by
Sultan)74. The consequences of the dichotomous structure of the Ottoman Empire
were noted by Mardin as follows:
...those trained with medrese ideals and their pious
followers as well as the administered, the ordinary
subjects of the Sultan’s servants, as a potential “team of
the just”, while the sultan’s servants and their application
of sultanic fiat could be considered as the “team of the
unjust.” Across centuries and dissimilar circumstances, the
teams of the just and unjust continued to be reformed and,
in the new circumstances of modernity, the basic rift
between the two was widened.75
Periphery or folk culture or the team of just changed much more slowly
and inparticular, the Islamic ideals of a just community acquired increasingly
ideological dimensions and became a “social cocoon” within which folk sought
protection from changes introduced by western–oriented reform.
By ‘center’ Mardin meant the group of leaders who saw themselves as
responsible for elaboration of policies for the country and who had the power and
the authority to carry those policies through76. Among the militaristic bureaucratic
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intelligentsia the idea of backwardness of periphery and the opposition of
periphery to innovations, modernization and development was the dominant idea.
The modernization of cultural life and mass communication widened the space
between high and low culture. In that situation the correlation of Islam and
Islamic culture with periphery had been witnessed. Periphery associated with
backwardness. These developments were the seeds of tension vis–a–vis the issue
of secularization.
Turkish conservatives have argued that Kemalist modernization should
come into agreement with what was traditional, what belonged to the periphery.
For that reason Turkish conservatives insisted on giving the right place to Islam
and the Ottoman Empire culture and tradition in the modern society. On the other
hand they were against Islamic universality as a way of governing a country. They
had aimed at giving space for the ‘team of Just’ in the modern Turkey.
The modernization of Turkey was still on the agenda of
the new politicians, but it was supposed to be promoted by
support for the needs of villages and provinciality and by
encouragement of their pursuits rather than by blueprints
for the establishment of a new society. New ideas
described as conservative were now expressed in
Parliament. These were ideas that promoted the retrieval
of Turkey’s Islamic inheritance, which had been jettisoned
during the years when secularism had become official
state policy. But, in fact there was more continuity
between the secular policies promoted by Atatürk and the
new emphasis on religious values than meets the eye77.
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Turkish Conservatives, Kemalism, Modernization, and Change
Turkish conservatives did not come up with a homogenous body of
thought. They had different attitudes concerning nationalism and Kemalism. This
was because they came from different philosophical backgrounds.
However, Turkish conservatives were collected around some common
themes and questions. These issues were (1) the consequences and future of
Kemalist revolutions, (2) the legitimacy methods used by Kemalism in these
revolutions, and (3) philosophical ground on which modernization goal should be
actualized. Turkish conservatives perceived their conservatism as one of the
interpretations of Kemalism and modernization. They attempted to formulate a
new set of philosophical, aesthetic, and political dimensions for the Kemalist
modernization project. This was because Turkish conservatives looked upon
themselves neither totally against Kemalism nor as Kemalists. They rejected to be
named “conservative” because they did not consider themselves as defenders of
the past order or status quo. They presented themselves as supporters of
modernization. The reason for their insistence that they were not against Kemalist
reforms and avoiding an association with conservatism were related to the
attitudes of the Kemalist bureaucratic intelligentsia on that issue. Kemalist
intelligentsia perceived all kinds of conservative views as efforts to revive the
political or social institutions of the Ottoman Empire. The views in question were
taken as reactionary by the Kemalist bureaucratic intelligentsia. All ideas and
institutions that originated outside the ruling elite were looked upon with
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suspicion and deemed dangerous. As it was indicated by Karpat, the reforming
elite ended up isolating itself from society at large and became a close–minded
and inward–looking ruling class. As a consequence the Turkish conservatives
wanted to differentiate themselves from religious reactants and conservatism that
was in the mind of Kemalist bureaucratic intelligentsia.
Historical genesis of the state tradition in Turkey determined the choices
made by modernizers in their attempt to delimit the scope of modernity. Turkish
modernization had shown an inclination to define modernization with
Westernization, which was a total project embracing and internalizing all cultural
dimensions that made Europe modern. As Kasaba has noted,78 as the underlying
assumption was that the once the environment was altered the behaviors of
individuals could be easily molded and made to fit the requirements of the life
newly created. Outward appearances gained importance in terms of
modernization. In Göle’s terminology, everything that was alafranka was deemed
proper and valuable; anything alaturka acquired a negative connotation 79.
According to Turkish conservatives, Kemalist reform’s lacked a
philosophical side dimension. Thus, although they did not oppose the Kemalist
reforms, Turkish conservatives tried to fill the space between the Kemalist
modernization project and the indigenous culture and tradition. According to
Göle80, the history of modernization in Turkey could be considered as an example
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imposed radical cultural transformation. During the 1930s, Turkish conservatives
wanted to localize modernization attempt. Another significant endeavor of
Turkish conservatives at that time that of finding out the attitudes and values that
constituted culture. Turkish conservatives wished to place religion, custom, and
tradition to their proper places in the modern society. By that way they aimed to
create a new base for “rootless”81 Kemalist modernization.
Another criticism directed against the Kemalist modernization project
was that modernization was not a mono–centered process. In other words, there
were more than one way to be modernized, and these ways should have been
determined according to culture and history. Modernization or change could not
be achieved by tearing of all your bonds with your culture and history.
Although Turkish conservatives have argued that everything was in
change throughout the history, they put stress on the preventing the collapse of the
components that compose national tradition such as language, religion, and
folklore, and the institutions that represented these components. Modernization,
which was isolated from history, could not be successful.
For that reason they put emphasis on both history and culture. Ülken82
defined “history awareness” as the recognition of our foundations and through
that lightening the potentials of today’s life. In that sense Turkish conservatives
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have thought that traditional institutions should maintain their core characteristics
and, as such, constitute a link between the past and the present.
The Turkish conservatives placed particular emphasis on culture. To
them, culture was the source of “common sense” among people. They have
argued that Kemalist reforms were imposed on periphery by the center, and that,
under these conditions there was a particular need to protect the culture.
‘Loss of community’ has been the leitmotiv that runs
through the much of the literature in republican era, in
both right – wing and its left  wing versions, but it is most
pronounces and occupied a much more central place in
conservative thought. Secondary driving force in Turkish
conservatism is ‘cultural synthesis’.83
Here, the “cultural synthesis”, which signified the possibility of bringing
together the cultural heritage of the past and to align it with changing socio–
economic  circumstances of the present.
Religion and Nationalism in Turkish Conservatism
The conservative tradition in Turkey was considered to have an
inclination towards religion and nationalism. During the 1930s, nationalism was a
dominant outlook among the Turkish conservatives. They rejected the
universalistic character of Islam. During that decade, the nationalist themes, were
of absolutely secular nature.
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 However with the transition to multi–party politics, revival of Islam in
the discourses of Turkish conservatism was witnessed. Traditionalism started to
be the main pillar nationalism. Atatürk was still the number one hero, but Sultan
Mehmet II’s conquest of Istanbul started to be emphasized. In time, there
developed a tendency to find out the Ottoman culture and the place of Islam in
that culture84.
At the turn of the century, along with Islamism and Ottomanism,
Nationalism was one of the remedies proposed to prevent the Ottoman Empire
from collapsing. After 1913, nationalism became an official ideology. With
Kemalist’s efforts to extricate the republic from its Islamic past and the nation–
building  process that followed, nationalism gained more importance. The process
culminated in the 1930s when among the non–official intellectual circles one
came across even ethic nationalism.
As İrem85 puts it “conservatism in Turkey was dominated by
nationalistic–romantic inclinations from the establishment of republican regime to
the 1940s.” Turkish conservatives aimed to resurrect historical consciousness,
drawing upon tradition and culture. Their endeavor in that direction focused on
proving that the sense of being Turk has historical roots.
Nationalist attitude of Turkish conservatives gained its concrete meaning
with the “culture” movement. There was a search for the roots of the nation or the
essence of being nation in the past through culture and tradition. And this search
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could only be carried out with historical conscience. Historical conscience would
provide guidelines in the modernization endeavors. The Turkish conservatives
criticized Kemalist modernization as having broken its ties with the past.
Conservatism now came to have a nationalistic interpretation of tradition, history,
and religion. “Historical conscience” was to facilitate the interpretation and
understanding the past and finding out the characteristics that made up the Turkish
nation and Turkish culture.
According to Karpat, nationalism in Turkey had a conservative stance,
since nationalism in that country presupposed the superiority of the state and the
nation over the individual. Karpat defined the traditionalist–conservatism as,
nationalist, which rejects everything related to individual, freedom, and
democracy, and looks with sympathy to authoritarian tendencies together with an
emphasis on leader superiority86.
Nationalism was one of the most important components of Turkish
conservatism. But it should be stated that the nationalist attitude of conservatives
had a tendency to find out its roots in history and culture. Their nationalistic
attitude was part of their endeavor to find out better path to modernization, would
rule out radical positivism.
Turning to Islam and conservatism, Islam continued to be one of the
main pillars of national culture, particularly during the 1930s and 1940s. Yet, as
noted, the Turkish conservatives did not harbor thoughts for a state based on
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Islam. On the other hand the place of Islam in the modern Turkish society should
not be overlooked.
In order to interpret the position of Islam in Turkish conservatism it
would be better to evaluate the position of Islam in Ottoman Empire and Turkish
Republic. Islam was not a system of belief; in addition, Islam had multi–
dimensional functions, which could be referred to as societal practices. Also, the
importance of Islam came from its ability to unify people under its moral
principles. In this way, Islam filled a significant gap in the society. Also, Islam
had tenets regarding daily life, which make it possible to live in a “just” manner.
As noted before, the position of Turkish conservatism concerning the
religion could be conceptualized as a view that rejects Islamic universality on the
one hand, yet, on the other hand, points out that that religion should have place in
the modern society, due to the fact that in that country there is not a sizeable
“atheist community”87. Turkish conservatives do not oppose the positivist and
secularist tendencies of Kemalist modernization but they think that religion should
not be excluded from individual life and society. Conservatives blame Islamism as
being an obstacle to modernization. Turkish conservatives aim to achieve peace
between positivist and secularist understanding of Kemalism and the traditional
perception of it. Turkish conservatives aimed to conciliate knowledge and belief.
According to Turkish conservative intellectuals, religious world views
are obstacles to the flourishing of an open society. Also, they can not be solutions
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to identity crises that frequently crop up as a result of continuous changes that
societies face. Yet Turkish conservative intellectuals find religion useful for
providing a moral foundation to the society.
A Conservative Intellectual: Erol Güngör
It is now in order to study a conservative intellectual in Turkey Professor
Erol Güngör will be taken into consideration. As  a conservative figure, Güngör,
was one of the several little known thinkers in Turkish intellectual life. It was
admitted by many that the significant place of Güngör in Turkish intellectual life
was little recognized. In order to signify the place and importance of Güngör in
the Turkish political thought, Alkan88 defined Güngör as ‘ a scientist who does not
have a successor’.
Güngör lived in the time period between 1938 and 1983. He published
his first article in 1959. Until his death he continued to be prolific. In his studies,
Güngör mostly dealt with the issues of Westernization project of Turkey, Islam,
Turkish national culture and identity – nationalism –,   morality and customs, and
their adaptability.
Güngör’s thoughts on the Westernization could be summarized through
that quotation taken from him:
When we compare present Turkey with the Tanzimat
period, during which Westernization movements were
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officially declared and accepted as a target, no one can
claim that we have accomplished our goals since then
(although some claim that we have made an improvement)
During the Tanzimat period we were under the danger of
being swallowed by Russia; today this danger still exits. In
those times we wanted to adopt western civilization and
by that way we wanted to enter West European state
community, today this is still our official policy...In short,
due to fact that Turkey’s Westernization project can not
achieve the expected results, Turkey should look back to
the past in order to understand where the mistake was
done.89
According to Güngör if the causes, for this state of affairs, were
investigated, one would find come across. These are, first, the coercive character
of modernization movement and, secondly, the way the modernization project was
to be carried out. Güngör has noted that in the view the intellectuals the cause
behind the collapse of Ottoman Empire and backwardness (compared to Western
countries) was the culture. The modernization process in Turkey was started as a
Westernization project, which is, adapting the cultural characteristics of the West.
This was what Güngör meant when he said “positivist attitude of the West was
misunderstood”.90 In other words, Güngör criticized the attitudes of intellectuals
from not taking into consideration the peculiar cultural characteristics of Turkey.
Although Güngör criticized the intellectuals, he was also fond of for
intellectuals to carry out the modernization project. He thought that in the
modernization project intellectuals should play the leading role. His criticism was
centered on the method used by the Republican elite.
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Güngör paid particular attention to intellectuals. Güngör used the term
münevver, which meant “enlightened”. Güngör differentiated münevver culture
from folk culture, which resembled the tension between cultural center and
periphery. Güngör has argued that intellectuals in Turkey did not have any rivals;
so they dominated the political sphere and it became difficult to control and
correct their failures.
Main failure of münevver in Turkish context was that the münevver was
alienated from his culture and consequently they could not bring forth
modernization. Since they did not pay attention to the culture; they could not
disseminate modernization to all layers of society. Münevver could not understand
Turkish culture; worth still, they accused it for Turkey’s failures. Related to this
issue, münevver rejected those components of the folk culture, which were shaped
by Islam, which was the source of morality and ethics in the Ottoman Empire.
Güngör compared and contrasted münevver and nationalists. In his opinion,
nationalists were aware of the significance of Turkish culture for modernization.
Güngör has proposed that modern society could only be achieved through cultural
and political unity, which was the motto of Turkish nationalists. In his view,
modernization should be outcome of blending of Western and Turkish cultures. If
not modernization could not go one step further than imitation.
Second reason behind the failure of modernization was hidden in the
intolerant attitude of münevver to others. Münevver acted in an authoritarian
manner towards those who did not think and act in accordance with what was in
the mind of münevver. If an institution or action or thought did not conform to
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münevver’s, it would be considered as reactionary and suppressed by the
münevver.
Güngör was not against the Westernization, in other words, to
modernization; he was against the way manner in which münevver tried to bring it
about. Also, like the republican intellectuals, he thought that modernization could
only be achieved by the intellectuals, but the problem was that the intellectuals did
not yet have capability of creating a genuine and modern national culture.
According to Güngör what was to be done today was not to try to find
out the proper control mechanism in order to protect Turkish culture from
unwanted effects of Western civilization, since this  two were impossible. What
was to be done today was to find ways of protecting  our culture. If this kind of
close relations with the West (or another foreign country) could be developed,
nothing was more natural than the adoption of both wanted and unwanted things.
If it was tried to define what was good or what was bad it would lead to the
exercise of undemocratic power and anti–scientific ways. What was crucial here
was to prevent our culture from weakening. The common characteristic of the
countries that had tried to adopt Western civilization, is that from materializing
their culture was not strong enough to prevent the harmful effects of the Western
culture. The misfortune of Turkey arose not from efforts to join another
civilization but from the deteriorating effects of Westernization on Turkish
culture. However, if Turkish culture was not strengthened it can not be expected
to resist and survive modernization.
59
Güngör has proposed that the Westernization project, should have a
nationalistic character. Nationalism should be used as a power resource in the
modernization of a country. All the opportunities and values of Turkish culture
should be used in order to reach upper levels. Civilization represented the
common aspects of various cultures; a society could have both a national culture
and a shared civilization. As to Güngör, the target of Turkish nationalists’ in the
Westernization was, through combination of Western civilization and Turkish
culture, that of creating a modern society and becoming united with the Turkic
world.
Güngör looked upon Islam in terms of its role in society and
modernization. According to him, Islam was one of the sources of Turkish culture
so a good grasp of Islam was important for understanding Turkish culture. Since
religion had great impact on Turkish traditional culture, it was one of the areas
that were attacked by münevver. The reasons behind the attack on religion were
not only limited to its impact on the culture, but it also had a political aspect.
According to our münevver, religion represented an underdeveloped society’s
culture. Republican intellectuals saw Islam, which was the main source of Turkish
culture, identity and morality, as the main source of our backwardness.
What was to be done according to Güngör was the interpretation of
Western civilization from the point of view Islam. He thought this should be the
duty of münevver.
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For Güngör not only democracy and secularization were inseparable, but
they were also related to Westernization and Islam. Güngör stated that in Turkey
secularization was seen as a one–sided issue. The reason for this was the wrong
and inconsistent convictions of münevver about the people. Before transition to
multi–party politics in 1945 secularism limited religion to freedom of conscience.
According to Güngör, this indicated that according to münevver religion should be
imprisoned into conscience.
In his formulation of nationalism, Güngör attributed importance to
culture, that is, to national history, morality, language, and religion (Islam).
According to Güngör nationalism was the name given to some cultural and social
movements91. Nationalism was an interpretation of a country’s history92.
Nationalism depended upon the national culture of the country in question.
Güngör correlated nationalism with populism since nationalism depended upon
the idea of national sovereignty.
Due to the fact that “culture” had been playing important role in the
conceptualization of nationalism by Güngör it is in order to give the definition of
culture by Güngör. He defined “culture” as the totality of beliefs, knowledge,
emotions, and feelings; in his opinion culture has a spiritual character93. Culture
subsumes beliefs, laws, and actions that a rise out of reactions to a country’s
history94.
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Güngör has been considered as a conservative thinker. One should
answer the question of what he tried to conserve? It is possible to suggest that he
tried to conserve the Turkish national culture. Because he saw Turkish national
culture as a “filter” to prevent unwanted elements of the West in the
Westernization project of Turkey national culture by the way of nationalism was
the only way to reach contemporary civilizations. The components of Turkish
national culture were the Ottoman legacy, Islam, and the inherited properties of
Turkish identity. Turkish identity was shaped by its Islamic characteristics and
historical legacy. The latter constituted the knowledge and experience gained in
Central Asia and in Anatolia.
Güngör thought münevver had come from the tradition of “Young Turk”
era and had become dominant after the transition to republican period. The
münevver who had been mostly criticized by Güngör were the reformist
intellectuals. These intellectuals, who were members of the Republican People’s
Party, held absolute power from the 1920s until the 1940s. He blamed them for
not knowing what the Turkish culture was for their authoritarian politics. For that
reason the transition to multi–party politics was welcomed by Güngör.
In Güngör’s opinion, in finding the true path common sense of people
was the most important guidance. People took their strength from culture and
morality. Thus they have a sense of what is right. In addition to culture, science
also had important place in the writings of Güngör. To be scientific did not mean
to be positivistic. Scientific thinking constituted only one side of the life. In order
to reach the knowledge one needed both the scientific and intuitive – moral –
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knowledge. Münevver had overlooked this fact.. Moral knowledge came from
Islam and showed the proper and right way. It developed with the exercise of
cultural rituals. Intuitive knowledge was the outcome of Turkish culture and
Turkish identity. According to Güngör, Turkish people had the inherent ability to
differentiate right from wrong. According to Güngör, if Turkish modernization
applied properly folk would have contributed to it.
As Güngör has noted, Islam was part of the Turkish culture. One could
not imagine non–Muslim a Turk. The character of Islam correlated with Turkish
culture perfectly. Islam also affected Turkish culture in a very positive way; it was
one of the reasons of Ottoman civilization. On the other hand, Güngör never
thought of Islamic state as a way of governing people; he strictly adhered to
democracy and republic.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION
TURKISH CONSERVATISM AND
EUROPEAN CONSERVATISM
Similarities between Turkish Conservatism and
European Conservatism
Conservatism generally arose as a “reactionary” movement due to radical
changes that had been taking place both at the national level and at the global
level. Due to its reactionary character, the initiation phase of conservatism
coincided with the modernization movements, which symbolized itself as a
radical break from tradition and what was gotten used to. In both European
conservatism and in Turkish conservatism one could see such a reaction.
Both the European conservatism and the Turkish conservatism correlated
with the idea of modernity. Both experiences of conservatism were the products
of modernization and grounded themselves in the context created by French
Revolution in Europe, by republic in Turkey. The existence of conservatism
coincided with modernization that became apparent with French Revolution and
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Industrial Revolution in the European case. As in the case of Europe, in Turkish
context, too, conservatism coincided with modernization or westernization
movements. Both of them by being reactionary and having critical attitudes
towards change and restructuring, introduced balance and moderation to change
and tried to avoid the radicalization of change.
What was the point in both European and Turkish conservatism was they
were not against smooth “change”. Both European and Turkish conservatism had
been appropriated with reform, in other words they were against that change that
deteriorated or terminated the harmony of natural change.
Both the European conservatism and the Turkish conservatism had a
critical approach towards political rationalism, which was based on restructuring
society according to abstract principles. According to conservatives society was
not a machine but an organism that developed slowly and adapted the
environment. Abstract principles could not be applied to state and society because
these would undermine traditions, which provided guideline for societal
development. According to conservatives both in European and Turkish context,
without the aid of experience, reason could not prescribe political ideas that
pureed reason could not be practical. This indicated the big gap between theory
and practice. This attitude of conservatives well stated by Beiser as,
It is seriously misleading to say that conservatives were
against all abstract laws and general principles, as if they
are anti–intellectuals or anti–rationalists. They are
opposed to methods by which the radicals arrived them. If
we want to know the proper principles of politics
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conservative argued, then we have to derive them from
experience. But this experience ... is nothing less than the
cumulative wisdom of the nation.95
Change could not be independent from the tradition of the community
since the economic, political, and social developments were shaped by this
cumulative knowledge. Both the European conservatism and the Turkish
conservatism reject a radical break from the past. The unification of the past and
present was common to both the European conservatism and the Turkish
conservatism. In the Turkish conservatism, it was referred to a cultural synthesis.
The major aim of conservatives in both camps was to maintain the cultural
heritage of past and to align it with changing socio–economic environment of the
present. This also meant the alignment of pays legal with pays reel. According to
conservatives, pays reel should not be neglected at the expense of pays legal.
Conservatives both in Europe and Turkey, reconciled religion and
nationalism. Conservatives in both contexts included religious rituals and
nationalist views in their discourses as part of properties of the issues that needed
to be conserved. Religion and nationalism were part of compounds of social
harmony in the community.
In both cases, religion and conservative attitudes correlated with each
other and religion was one of the important aspects of conservative discourse. In
the European conservatism and the Turkish conservatism the role of religion
gained its meaning as being inescapable and undeniable part of social stability and
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strength of uniting society. Religion had a vital role in societal harmony and it
provided equilibrium. Religion was not proposed as a doctrine or a total
experience in governing society in both experiences. Also, in both cases, each
experience of conservatism used nationalism and nationalistic rituals and values
as a part of their conceptualization and reaction.
Again both cases, what united the conservatives despite all differences
and what distinguished them from liberals was their inclination to paternalism in
the initial phases of conservatism. Conservatives continued to believe that purpose
of the state was to promote the welfare, religion, and morality of its subjects and
not only protect their rights. Together with paternalism, communalism was also
emphasized in the conservative discourse both in Europe and Turkey. The
paternal state concept realized itself in the Turkish context as father–state (devlet
baba), which meant that state as was the protector of community and looked after
it. It also symbolized loyalty and great respect towards the state. This
conceptualization of state is still dominant in the political landscape of Turkish
politics; lost its saliency in the European context.
Differences between Turkish Conservatism and
European Conservatism
In Europe, conservatism was an ideology developed and evolved as a
criticism of the effects and ideas that were spread as a result of French revolution.
In the Turkish context, the position of French revolution was filled by the
establishment of Republic.
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As different from its French counterpart, Turkish revolution did not
include violence in the conversion of political system96. Turkish revolution was
not a movement that was supported by masses. French revolution took place as a
revolution from bottom to top, whereas Turkish revolution was a revolution from
top to bottom. In the European context, conservatism was a movement of
aristocracy. In the case of Turkey, modernization attempts initiated were by
bureaucrats and imposed upon people. In that respect Turkish conservatism
developed as a critique of these reforms and aimed to protect some societal
identities and for tying reforms with tradition and culture.
The Turkish conservatives were not totally against the novelties brought
by the republican regime, first, secularism, and then democracy. Turkish
conservatives insisted that these reforms should be moderated. In the first years of
French revolution, conservatives opposed the most fundamental ideas of the
revolution such as individual rights and popular sovereignty. The conservatives in
the latter context are opposed to political emancipation, which are popular
sovereignty, liberal individualism and egalitarianism. In addition to political
equality, European conservatives had an ambivalent attitude towards economic
and social equality.
While the French revolution represented the values of liberty and
equality, conservatives as counter revolutionaries valued authority and inequality.
The principle of authority was to be realized through the principle of hierarchy.
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Since the society should be governed according to the principle of hierarchy,
popular sovereignty, which emphasized equal opportunity, was one of the issues
that were not approved by conservatives. These were seen by conservatives as the
deterioration of the natural social harmony and social hierarchy. According to the
European conservatives, political and social developments should have been
independent from the human will and reason. They did not look with favor to
“rational elite” making judgements for the “irrational masses”.
Although Turkish conservatives put emphasis on the leading role of
intelligentsia in the modernization process and stressed the importance of organic
view of society, they did not claim there was an inherent inequality and natural
hierarchy in the society. This also highlighted the issue that Turkish
conservatives, as oppose to European conservatives, were not opposed to popular
sovereignty.
European conservatism was developed against values of the bourgeois
class. The rights that were proposed with French revolution made the position of
bourgeoisie class more effective and powerful. After the Industrial revolution,
collaboration was witnessed between old conservatives and the bourgeoisie
against the newly rising working class.
Compared to Europe, Turkish societal structure was very different. In the
Ottoman Empire and the republic, the military and civil bureaucrats led the
modernization movement. In the Turkish case, conservatives mostly came from
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the bureaucratic intelligentsia and they opposed the rough edges of the republican
reforms.
If the “class” would be defined as societal formation that is constituted
around economic interests, in the Turkish context one could not find groups that
correlated with the class in this sense. The effective groups in directing politics in
Ottoman Empire were the ones that could become a united with political structure.
That was the reason behind the domination of the bureaucratic and military
intelligentsia in modernization.
Another differentiating character between the Turkish and the European
cases arose from the fact that they had different state and land administration
systems which would lead to structural differences among these contexts. In
Europe before modernization, Feudal System, which was decentralized, was
dominant in both the state affairs and land administration. In Ottoman Empire,
centralization and concomitantly the post of Sultan were important dimensions in
terms of administration. The strong state tradition both in institutional and in
cultural levels in Ottoman Empire could be observed. Turkish republic seemed to
have inherited from Ottoman Empire a strong state and a weak society tradition.
Whereas in Europe feudal system, which permitted to some extend
decentralization, could be seen.
The Ottoman–Turkish polity in its long process of
evolution came to stand at the opposite pole so far as the
English case is concerned. If in the case of England the
antecedent endogenous variable was centralized
feudalism, and, if in France it was decentralized
feudalism, in the case of the Ottoman it was
patrimonialism. Whereas in both centralized and
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decentralized feudalism central authority is effectively
checked by countervailing powers, in patrimonialism the
periphery is almost totally subdued by the center97.
In absolute monarchies in the West feudal lords were in the effective
position. French revolution was accomplished against the rights and effectiveness
of this aristocracy, monarch, and landowners. The existence of an aristocratic
class was questionable in the Turkish context. As Heper98 has noted both at the
center and in the localities, the old Turkish aristocracy was gradually removed
from its position as a ruling class. The starting point of conservatism in the
European case correlated with the loss of power of aristocracy however, the
Turkish conservatism did not arise from powerlessness of a specific class.
The goal of the Turkish conservatism was to close the gap between
center and periphery, and terminate the tension between the two. Conservatism in
Turkey claimed to represent the notions of periphery due to its strong emphasis on
culture, tradition, and Islamic values. Conservatism in Turkey placed emphasis on
the “fact” that Kemalist modernization should come to agreement with what was
traditional and what was belonged to the periphery for achieving a viable
modernization.
In that respect, Turkish conservatism aimed to represent folk culture and
put emphasis on it, whereas European conservatism sought to represent
aristocratic culture.
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Conservatism arose as a defensive attitude both in Turkey and in Europe.
Defensive attitude, which grounded itself on the preservation of necessary
components of history, tradition, and community, prevented a radical breakdown
from taking place. As it has noted in the previous chapters, conservatism was
developed as a defensive attitude of those lost their power and status. In the
European case, conservatism at first stages was a movement of aristocracy as a
result of their loss of power in economic, political, and social spheres. In the
Turkish context, during the first series of modernization attempts during Ottoman
times, it was an attitude on the part of the janissary corps and religious
institutions. In the Turkish case, janissary corps and religious institutions were
held responsible for the collapse of the empire.
In the European case, conservatism arose as a reaction to the values such
as liberty and equality and the bourgeois interests that became dominant with the
French Revolution. The second response of the European conservatism arose
against the liberalism and industrial capitalism, which were seen as morally
atomistic and hence corrosive of social order a public responsibility. Thirdly,
conservatism emerged against socialism, which developed in the last quarter of
the 19th century and the conservatives together with the bourgeoisie took its place
against the working class.
During the 1930s the Turkish conservatives put emphasis on nationalism
as one of the indispensable parts of Turkish culture; after 1950s Islam entered into
the scene of conservative thinking as an important element of culture and
discourse. Although conservatism adopts itself to changing circumstances in both
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the European and the Turkish cases, the main theme of conservatism did not
change.
The European conservatism started for protecting the position of Church.
Without exception, German, French, and British conservatisms were all supported
by the clerical leaders of the old regime. Revolution had attacked the Church and
put emphasis on secularization. This led to the development of an organic bond
between conservatism and the Church. Turkish conservatism had never been
associated with the religious institution and never aimed to protect the position of
the religious institution. Turkish conservatism had a strong secularist emphasis.
The position of Christianity in the European context and the position of
Islam in the Turkish context were different; these differences in affected the social
and political structures of these two different contexts.
The Catholic Church in Europe was very influential during the medieval
ages; in every aspect of the life the effectiveness of Church could be readily seen.
It functioned as one of the ruling powers in the political system of Europe. Church
was an institutionalized organ in the administrative system of Europe. After the
French revolution with increasing trend of secularization Christianity became one
of the bases of conservative thinking. According to the conservatives, the
decreasing role of religion would have led to an unstable and conflictual society.
For this reason European conservative were opposed to secularization trend that
had accelerated after the French revolution.
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Islam in Ottoman Empire and in Turkish Republic had different
characteristics. Islam was not only a belief system. Law system of Ottoman
Empire depended upon Şeriat in terms of state and land administration. Ulema,
who acted as civil servants and guaranteed the control of societal life, were
integrated into the state administrative system in Ottoman Empire. From this
perspective, the Ottoman administration was dominated on the hand by Islamic
and, on the other hand by bureaucratic characteristics. Up to the 17th century, the
dominance of Islamic characteristics left its place to bureaucratic dominance. The
decrease of Islamic tendencies in the state administration was followed by the
association of local notables, who were one of the constituents of periphery.
Islam was associated with periphery by reformers due to the fact that
Islam was seen as one of the reasons behind the backwardness of Ottoman
Empire. So, with the modernization movements the role of Islam in the state
administration declined. Related to that issue in the Republican period, there were
strong secularization tendencies. As different from its European counterparts,
Turkish conservatives perceived Islamism as one of the obstacles to the
modernization and placed emphasis on secularization in order to be modern.
In Europe, following the amalgamation of conservatism with
nationalism, militant nationalism placed its imprint upon conservatism. Especially
in the case of France and Germany, racist tendencies emerged as anti–Semitic
movements, which were based on the idea of inequality of races. The anti–Semitic
characteristics of European conservatism did not find its expression in the Turkish
conservatism. Turkish conservatism did not have racist tendencies, at least in its
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discourse. In Turkish conservatism, nationalism always had a cultural base, which
was used as a unifying motive.
In the Turkish case, due to single–party period restrictions, initially
conservatives could not be organized around a party structure. “Journalism” was
the common ground where Turkish conservatives discussed and published their
ideas on various issues. In the case of Europe, conservatives were organized
around political parties. Especially in the case of Britain, the Conservative Party
has been politically successful and governed the country for long periods. In the
Turkish case, in the multi–party period, although conservatism was mentioned in
the programs of several political parties such as the Motherland Party, there has
not been any political party constituted solely on the principles of conservatism.
Among the three European countries discussed in this essay, German
conservatism is the one resembled most the Turkish conservatism. The
resemblance between Turkish conservatism and German conservatism lied in the
fact that in the both cases metaphysical and historical visions had been dominant.
In addition to that there had been an inclination toward the past and to the
importance of the history, culture and tradition. Not unlike German conservatism,
Turkish conservatism might have been called “romantic conservatism” because in
Turkey too, especially after the 1940s there has been a strong nostalgia for the
idealized past. Compared to other European countries, both Germany and Turkey
are late modernizers and both experienced the Enlightenment; however, no
political revolution followed this enlightenment process. In other words, neither
Turkey nor Germany did experience a radical break from the past as a result of a
political revolution.
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